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JACOB M. HEATH (STATE BAR NO. 238959)
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ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
By Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo
1000 Marsh Road
ON
05/05/2022
Menlo Park, CA 94025-1015
/s/ Jimenez, Vanessa
By
Telephone:
+1 650 614 7400
Deputy Clerk
Facsimile:
+1 650 614 7401
Electronically
Attorneys for Defendant
RECEIVED
FACEBOOK, INC.
4/26/2022

7

CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,
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Case No. 21-CIV-05055
[PROPOSED] ORDER SUSTAINING
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DEMURRER
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Time:
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[PROPOSED] ORDER
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On April 22, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s
(“Facebook”) demurrer (“Demurrer”) to Plaintiff Dr. Andrew Forrest’s First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). After hearing and considering the parties’ positions as to the Demurrer, the Court
adopted its April 21, 2022 tentative ruling (“Tentative Ruling”) sustaining the Demurrer with
prejudice as to the Fifth Cause of Action of Plaintiff’s FAC and without prejudice as to First
through Fourth Causes of Action of the FAC.
The Court granted Plaintiff until June 3, 2022 to file and serve a Second Amended
Complaint with respect to the First through Fourth Causes of Action. The Tentative Ruling,
attached to this order as Exhibit A, is otherwise adopted.
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SIGNED

IT IS ORDERED.

By Is/ Foiles, Robert
05/04/2022

14
15
16

Dated _____________, 2022
HON. ROBERT D. FOILES
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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9:00
LINE: 6
21-CIV-05055
DR. ANDREW FORREST VS. FACEBOOK, INC.

DR. ANDREW FORREST
FACEBOOK, INC.

BRIAN E. KLEIN
JACOB M. HEATH

HEARING ON DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT
FACEBOOK, INC.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Demurrer based on Communications Decency Act
Demurrer to the entire complaint based on the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”) is sustained as to the first, second, third, fourth, and
fifth causes of action. (47 U.S.C. § 230, subd. (c)(1).)
In Force v. Facebook, the plaintiffs were survivors of persons who
were killed in Israel by members of Hamas. The plaintiffs alleged that
Facebook was liable for “giving Hamas a forum with which to
communicate and for actively bringing Hamas' message to interested
parties.” Like Plaintiff Forrest, the plaintiffs in Force alleged that
Facebook “does not act as a publisher,” because “it uses algorithms to
suggest content to users, resulting in ‘matchmaking.’” The Court of
Appeal held that using “matchmaking” algorithms to direct content to
readers is a function of a publisher. “[A]rranging and distributing
third-party information inherently forms ‘connections’ and ‘matches’
among speakers, content, and viewers of content, whether in
interactive internet forums or in more traditional media. That is an
essential result of publishing.” (Force v. Facebook, Inc. (2d Cir.
2019) 934 F.3d 53, 66.)
Like a publisher, Facebook decided “where . . . particular third-party
content should reside and to whom it should be shown. . . ., [and]
what type and format of third-party content they will display.” (Force
v. Facebook, Inc. (2d Cir. 2019) 934 F.3d 53, 66–67.)
Facebook's algorithms might cause more such
“matches” than other editorial decisions. But that
is not a basis to exclude the use of algorithms
from the scope of what it means to be a
“publisher” under Section 230(c)(1). The matches
also might . . . present users with targeted
content of even more interest to them . . . . But
it would turn Section 230(c)(1) upside down to
hold that Congress intended that when publishers
of third-party content become especially adept at
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performing the functions of publishers, they are
no longer immunized from civil liability.
(Id.)
The Force case involved algorithms that directed content to readers
who might be more interested in the content (“matchmaking”) Plaintiff
Forrest’s complaint repeatedly describes Facebook’s acts as “curating
the user experience.” Without defining “curating,” Plaintiff alleges
that Facebook is doing exactly what it was doing in the Force case:
using algorithms to direct content to a subset of users based on those
users’ interests and demographics (“data points” (see FAC ¶¶ 3-4, 11,
53, 57, 71.)
As in Force, Forrest’s claims are based on Facebook’s using automation
to determine where certain ads are seen and by whom. Facebook is being
sued for its role as a publisher of ads. Therefore, Section 230(c)(1)
immunizes Facebook from liability for all claims arising from
Facebook’s role as a publisher.
Demurrers to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims are be
sustained because each of those claims is based on allegations that
Facebook committed acts in the role of a publisher, which Section
230(c)(1) precludes.
Additional Grounds for Sustaining Demurrer
In addition to immunity under the CDA, demurrer to the Second, Fourth,
and Fifth causes of action is sustained for the following reasons.
Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action is sustained because
“substantial assistance” may occur only when the Defendant’s “own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.” (Saunders v. Super. Ct. (1994) 27 Cal. App.4th 832,
846.) “It is essential that the defendant's own conduct was tortious.
The particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility must
have proceeded tortiously - i.e., with intent to commit a tort or with
negligence.” (Coffman v. Kennedy (1977) 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 32.) The
FAC does not allege any acts by Facebook that are independently
tortious.
Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is sustained because a duty to
warn does not exist absent a special relationship between Facebook and
Plaintiff. (Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1976) 17 Cal. 3d
425, 435.) Plaintiff Forrest argues that a special relationship is
required only when “nonfeasance” causes harm, whereas Plaintiff
alleges “misfeasance.” (Opp. at 12-13.) The alleged misfeasance,
however, consists of acts of a publisher, which are immunized by the
CDA.
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Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to
amend because Negligent design is a products liability concept. (See
Opp. at 12:16-18.) Plaintiff cites no authority holding that the legal
theory of products liability, including duty of care, extends to
interactive computer services.
Terms of Service and Statute of Limitations Arguments Lack Merit.
1.
Demurrer based on Terms of Service lacks merit. The Terms of
Service document provides that the Terms govern “your” use of
Facebook. (Mov. RJN, Ex. A, at p.1.) The claims in the FAC are not
based on Plaintiff’s use of Facebook; they are based on Facebook’s
conduct. Therefore, the Terms of Service do not apply to Forrest’s
claims. The claims asserted by Forrest could be asserted by a person
who never used Facebook, but suffered the same harm. It is
unreasonable to hold that the Terms of Service are a defense against a
Facebook user, but not against a non-Facebook user who has suffered
the same harm.
2.
Demurrer based on statute of limitations lacks merit. The
demurrer is based on the allegation that Forrest knew of his claims
“on or about late March 2019.” (Mov. at 20:10.) When a Complaint
alleges that a cause of action accrued “on or about” a specific date,
a statute-of-limitations argument does not support demurrer. (Childs
v. State of California (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 155, 159-60.) Further,
Judicial Council Emergency Rule 9.12 extends the limitations period
for six months. Even if “on or about late March 2019” could be an
operative date of accrual, the six-month tolling extends the
limitations period to some unspecified date in September 2021. The
demurrer does not establish that the common law claims are time-barred
as a matter of law.
Ruling
Demurrer is sustained as to all causes of action. Plaintiff is granted
leave of court to file and serve a Second Amended Complaint addressing
the above defects, except for the Fifth Cause of action for which
leave is not granted, no later than May 20, 2022.
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of
the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendant Facebook, Inc. shall
prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the
Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312,
and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have
appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of
Court.

